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ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
RAoUL BERGE'
"Men naturally trust in their government, and ought to do so, and
they ought not to suffer for it."*W RONGS WHICH ORDINARILY "SHOCK THE CONscIENcE and justify
the intervention -of a court of equity," it is said, can yet not
found an estoppel against the government.' At first sight this
is strange doctrine. For equitable estoppel is based upon principles of
morality and justice,2 and it is scarcely debatable that government action
should exhibit even "more scrupulous regard to justice and a higher
morality" than is required of individuals. 3
Although the government itself has stamped repudiation of an earlier
position as "unconscionable,"14 it yet claims total immunity from equitable
estoppel5 and some courts have echoed that sweeping claim.6 Some courts
t Member of the District of Columbia Bar.
* Menges v. Dentler, 33 Pa. 495, 500 (1859).
1Schafer v. Helvering, 83 F. 2d 317, 320 (App. D.C., 1936).
2 The ultimate principle, said Mr. Justice Cardozo, is that "no one shall be permitted to
found any claim upon his own inequity or take advantage of his own wrong." R. H. Steams Co.
v. United States, 291 U.S. 54, 62 (1934).
The Supreme Court earlier said: "The vital principle is, that he who... leads another to
do what he would not otherwise have done, shall not subject such person to loss or injury by
disappointing the expectations upon which he acted. Such a change of position is sternly for-
bidden. It involves fraud and falsehood, and the law abhors both." Dickerson v. Colgrove,
100 U.S. 578, 580 (1880). See also Morgan v. Railroad Co., 96 U.S. 716, 720 (1878); Van
Rensselaer v. Kearney, 11 How. (U.S.) 297, 325,326 (1850).
Our discussion is confined to the situation in which one party acted to his detriment in re-
liance upon what the other party did or said. Cf. Helvering v. Schine Chain Theatres, 121 F.
2d 948, 950 (C.A. 2d, 1941). For present purposes, it suffices to note that election and estoppel
are often used interchangeably. Cf. Vestal v. Commissioner, 152 F. 2d 132, 135 (App. D.C.,
1945); Wurtsbaugh v. Commissioner, 187 F. 2d 975 (C.A. 5th, 1951).
'Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. (U.S.) 190, 207 (1850); Pawlett v. Attorney General,
Hardres *465, 469 (1667) (Baron Atkyns): "[lit would derogate from the King's honour to
imagine, that what is equity against a common person, should not be equity against him."
See also Robinson v. South Australia, [1931] A. C. 704, 716.
4 Taylor v. Commissioner, 89 F. 2d 465, 466 (C.A. 7th, 1937). The government's change of
position was stamped as "unconscionable" in Stockstrom v. Commissioner, 190 F. 2d 283, 289
(App. D.C., 1951).
5 United States v. Coast Wineries, 131 F. 2d 643, 650 (C.A. 9th, 1942). Apparently English
administrators make similar unjustifiable claims. Farrer, A Prerogative Fallacy-"That the
Crown Is Not Bound by Estoppel," 49 L.Q. Rev. 511 (1933).
6"Estoppel may not be invoked against the government." West Texas Utilities Co. v.
NationalLabor Relations Board, 184 F. 2d 233,239 (App. D.C., 1950); Spencer v. Railroad Re-
tirement Board, 166 F. 2d 342, 343 (C.A. 3d, 1948); United States v. Ohio Oil Co., 163 F. 2d
ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT 681
have held, on the other hand, that the government is immune from
estoppel only when it has acted in a "governmental" as distinguished
from "proprietary" capacity.7 In its most recent estoppel decision, Merrill
v. Federal Crop Insurance Corporation," the Supreme Court, splitting five
to four, held that the form in which the government functioned was not
controlling if the action on which the estoppel was based was unauthorized.
One shares Mr. Justice Jackson's lively dissatisfaction with a result that
requires an Idaho farmer to search the Federal Register to learn whether
he may safely purchase crop insurance from an officer of the government
who offers to sell it.9 The courts themselves have characterized the im-
munity from estoppel doctrine as "harsh" and "severe,"' 1 and have ap-
plied it with "great reluctance,"" at times accompanied by judicial
groans.' 2
633, 641 (C.A. 10th, 1947); Burnham Chemical Co. v. Krug, 81 F. Supp. 911, 913 (D.D.C.,
1949); Wells v. Long, 68 F. Supp. 671, 672 (S.D. Idaho, 1946); Bowles v. Hansen Packing Co.,
64 F. Supp. 131, 133 (D. Mont., 1946); United States v. Leccony Smokeless Fuel Co., 64 F.
Supp. 269, 270 (S.D. W.Va., 1946); United States v. National Gypsum Co., 49 F. Supp. 206,214 (W.D. N.Y., 1942); United States v. Hess, 41 F. Supp. 197, 217 (W.D. Pa., 1941); 0. D.
Jennings & Co. v. Reinecke, 19 F. Supp. 197, 200 (N.D. Ill., 1937); Huron Portland Cement
Co. v. Woodworth, 19 F. 2d 530, 534 (E.D. Mich., 1921).
7United States v. City and County of San Francisco, 112 F. Supp. 451, 454 (N.D. Cal.,
1953); The Falcon, 19 F. 2d 1009, 1014 (D. Md., 1927); Elrod Slug Casting Mach. Co. v.
O'Malley, 57 F. Supp. 915, 920 (D. Neb., 1944); England National Bank v. United States,282 Fed. 121, 127 (C.A. 8th, 1922). For application of estoppel to government in "proprietary"
capacity, see Branch Banking and Trust Co. v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 757, 766, 768(Ct. Cl., 1951); Ohio Oil Company v. United States, 65 F. Supp. 991, 997 (D. Wyo., 1946),
rev'd, United States v. Ohio Oil Company, 163 F. 2d 633, 641 (C.A. 10th, 1947) ("traditional
inapplicability of the doctrine of estoppel against the United States").
8 332 U.S. 380 (1947). See also Mclndoe v. United States, 194 F. 2d 602, 603 (C.A. 9th,
1952).
9 Mr. Justice Jackson, in a dissent joined in by Mr. Justice Douglas (Black and Rutledge,
JJ., also dissented), remarked (332 U.S. 380,387) that: "[I]t is an absurdity to hold that every
farmer who insures his crops knows what the Federal Register contains.... One should not be
expected to have to employ a lawyer to see whether his own Government is issuing him a policy
which in case of loss would turn out to be no policy at all."
10 Burnham Chemical Co. v. Krug, 81 F. Supp. 911, 913 (D.D.C., 1949).
1 United States v. Globe Indemnity Co., 17 F. Supp. 838, 846 (S.D. N.Y., 1936); Sternfeld
v. United States, 32 F. 2d 789, 791 (N.D. N.Y., 1929).
1In Walker Hill Co. v. United States, 162 F. 2d 259, 263 (C.A. 7th, 1947), the court, deny-
ing estoppel, declared: "It never gives us a satisfactory, reassuring feeling, however, for the
government to repudiate the acts of one of its agents performed in the course of his duties."Dissenting from a holding of estoppel against the government, Circuit Judge Prettyman
said: "I wish the law were as they [the majority] find it to be, because it is my belief that the
Government ought to set a high standard in its dealings and relationships with citizens and
that the word of a duly authorized Government agent, acting within the scope of his authority
ought to be as good as a government bond." Stockstrom v. Commissioner, 190 F. 2d 283, 289(App. D.C., 1951). The majority in that case declared that "[tiaxpayers expect, and are en-
titled to receive, ordinary fair play from tax officials. We regard as unconscionable. .." the
Commissioner's change of position. Ibid., at 298.
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Mounting exasperation with a rule that permits repudiation of the legal
advice which administrative officials are constantly giving13 and which
government agencies often lead the public to believe such officials are
authorized to'give,14 led to the introduction in April 1953 of Senate bill
S.1752, exempting persons who rely on written statements by responsible
agencies from damages or penalties.15 But the bill does not go far enough;
it fails to provide for losses incurred if claims are pressed by the govern-
ment against, or denied to, persons who relied on such statements. More-
over, the legislative mills grind slowly.18
It needs to be emphasized that the courts are free to correct their own,
judge-made rule without awaiting legislation,17 that there is no govern-
ment immunity from estoppel if the official conduct was authorized, and
that policy considerations require a realistic approach to the problem
whether official conduct was "authorized." There is also need to re-ex-
amine the rule that the government may repudiate an official interpreta-
tion by reliance on the "mistake of law" doctrine, and to review the prin-
ciples governing the right of an administrative officer to overrule the deci-
sion of a predecessor. Analysis of the government's "change of position"
must likewise take into account the extent to which new tax rulings or
regulations may be given retroactive effect in the face of a taxpayer's re-
liance upon the superseded regulation. It may be added that the problem
of governmental immunity from estoppel is most acute in the tax field be-
cause of (1) the great volume of tax cases, (2) the unduly cautious appli-
cation of estoppel to the government in such cases, and (3) statutory
ambiguities which complicate the estoppel-immunity problem in the tax
"* See Newman, Should Official Advice be Reliable?-Proposals as to Estoppel and Re-
lated Doctrines in Administrative Law, 53 Col. L. Rev. 374 (1953). Blair-Smith, Forms ofAdministrative Interpretation Under the Securities Laws, 26 Iowa L. Rev. 241,243, 246 (1941).
14 Compare the annual invitation to the public to avail itself of the services of agents of the
Internal Revenue Bureau in making out tax returns.
"Sen. 1752, 83d Cong. 1st Sess. (1953). A previously proposed bill is discussed in New-
man, op. cit. supra note 13.
16 Compare Herman Oliphant's suggestion in 1938 of a tax code provision comparable to
§ 209(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act which exempts one who in good faith acts in
reliance on a rule or regulation, though it later be rescinded or declared invalid. Oliphant,
Declaratory Rulings, 24 A.B.A.J. 7, 9 (1938). Legislative inaction on such proposals is at best
equivocal in light of the flood of new legislative proposals that submerges the Congress at
each session.
17 "When ... a rule is not statutory, but a rule of judiciary law, and.., the modification
will plainly serve the ends of justice, it would seem appropriate that ... the courts themselves
should do the needful." Hammond-Knowlton v. United States, 121 F. 2d 192, 201 (C.A. 2d,
1941).
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field. Consequently special emphasis will be given to the tax aspect of the
claimed immunity from estoppel.
BASIS OF THE IMnTY
Governmental immunity from estoppel, it has been held, is an offshoot
of sovereign immunity.18 That claim may draw some comfort from early
English dicta,19 but such dicta do not represent English law.20 An English
commentator has labelled the notion that the Crown is not bound by
estoppel "a prerogative fallacy."'21 In the United States the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is in current disfavor 22 and offers uneasy support to
doctrines that work hardship and injustice.
A glance at the earliest and most recent Supreme Court cases will fur-
nish a background against which to evaluate the rationalizations ad-
vanced for immunity. In Lee v. Munre,23 the Commissioners of the city
of Washington, pursuant to an authorization to sell public lands, contract-
ed with Morris and Nicholson for the sale. The latter made deposits of
money with the Commissioners and from time to time advised them to
convey to designated persons. Supposing that Morris and Nicholson had
not received land to the value of the sum deposited by them, the Commis-
sioners informed Lee that they would convey certain lots to him if he
would obtain an order from Morris and Nicholson. Thereupon, Lee sur-
rendered a note given by Morris and Nicholson to them in return for such
an order. The Commissioners then discovered that Morris and Nicholson
had received all the land to which they were entitled and refused to honor
the order. The Supreme Court held that the Commissioners' promises were
not binding upon the government because they were "altogether gratui-
tous and not being within the sphere of their official duties." 24 One may
Is Trustees of Philip Exeter Academy v. Exeter, 90 N.H. 472, 495, 27 A. 2d 569, 586 (1940).
The state cases exhibit almost the same problems as the federal. See Clark, Estoppel Against
State, County and City, 23 Wash. L. Rev. 51 (1948).
19 Sir Edward Coke's Case, Godholt *289, 299 (1623); Queen v. Delme, 10 Mod. *198, 200
(1713). English concepts of the royal prerogative have entered into our own political state.
Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. (U.S.) 227, 239 (1874).
20 Attorney General v. Collom, [1916] 2 K.B. 193, 204: "A further point was raised that no
estoppel binds the crown .... I know of no authority for the proposition as applied to estoppel
in pas." See also Plimmer v. The Mayor, [1884].9 App. Cas. 699.
21 Farrer, op. cit. supra note 5.
2Keifer and Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 306 U.S. 381, 391 (1939);
Wallace v. United States, 142 F. 2d 240, 243 (C.A. 2d, 1944).
23 7 Cranch (U.S.) 366 (1813).
24 Ibid., at 369.
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doubt the absence of authority under the circumstances,2 but we are here
concerned with the reasons advanced for this holding:
It is better that an individual should now and then suffer by such mistakes than to
,introduce a rule against an abuse of which, by improper collusions, it should be very
difficult for the public to protect itself.26
In 175 years of federal administration the amount of "improper collu-
sion" by federal officers has been remarkably small. Even if such collusion
were more significant, the cost of insuring the faithfulness of its employees
ought to be borne by the government, not thrust upon the luckless vic-
tims of their faithlessness.2 7 To the extent that a deterrent against public
fraud is required, it is supplied by the severe criminal sanctions imposed
for defrauding the government. A democratic government which rests on
consent of the governed should take care in every part of the system, as
Daniel Webster said, "not only to do right, but to satisfy the community
that right is done. ' '28 To preserve confidence in popular government is of
higher importance than to avert occasional frauds.
2 9
In later cases, the fear that the agent may "ruin the principal"30 no
longer finds expression. Instead, the Supreme Court has repeatedly em-
phasized that an estoppel does not lie where the officer does "what the
law does not sanction or permit." 31 In other words, unauthorized conduct
will not work an estoppel.
3 2
25In the words of the plaintiff, "[t]he commissioners were acting within the scope of their
authority. It was their business to keep the accounts with Morris and Nicholson, to know the
balance; it was also their business to convey the lots." Ibid., at 367.
The Commissioners had been conveying to purchasers at the order of Morris and Nichol-
son; it was their business to know whether Morris and Nicholson were entitled to further
conveyances. See pages 692-93 infra.
26 Ibid., at 370. In The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. (U.S.) 666, 681 (1869), the fear that the
agent might "ruin the principal" led the government to repudiate the action of the Secretary
of War himself. See also Whiteside v. United States, 93 U.S. 247, 257 (1876).
27Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law, 185-89 (1921), pointed out the 'increasing
tendency to hold that public funds should respond for injuries to individuals by public agen-
cies."
28 5 Writings and Speeches of Daniel Webster 163, quoted by Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
concurring, in Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 149, 172 n. 19 (1951).
29 Cf. United States v. Willamette V. & C. M. Wagon-Road Co., 54 Fed. 807, 811 (C.C.
Ore., 1892).
20 See note 26 supra.
31United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 32- (1940); Utah Power & Light Co. v.
United States, 243 U.S. 389,408 (1917); Wilber National Bank v. United States, 294 U.S. 120,
124 (1935).
2
"An officer or agency of the United States to whom no administrative authority has been
delegated cannot estop the United States even by an affirmative undertaking to waive or
surrender a public right." United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 70 (1940). See also Filor v.
United States, 9 Wall. (U.S.) 45,49 (1870).
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A striking example is furnished by the previously mentioned case,
Merrill v. Federal Crop Insurance Corporation,3 3 where the government
acted in what, in view of prior cases, might be regarded as a "proprietary"
rather than a governmental capacity. An Idaho farmer purchased crop
insurance from Federal Crop Insurance Corporation on the faith of assur-
ances by its agent that the crop of reseeded winter wheat was insurable.
After a drought destroyed his crop, the farmer learned that his reliance
was misplaced. The lower courts held that the Corporation, like a private
insurance company, was bound by the acts of its agent. But, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court, rejected the
idea that government is "partly public or partly private, ' 34 and held that,
"whatever the form in which the Government functions,"," one deals with
it at the risk of accurately ascertaining that its agent "stays within the
bounds of his authority,"3" that such limitations may be expressed in
proper regulations as well as statutes, that the regulation precluded such
insurance, and that notice of the regulations was given by publication in
the Federal Register.37
There can be no dissent from Mr. justice Jackson's insistence that a
federal insurance agency should be held to "the same fundamental prin-
ciples of fair dealing" that progressive states apply to private companies.38
"3 332 U.S. 380 (1947).
34 Ibid., at 383. But the distinction has respectable authority: "[A] government may suffer
loss through the negligence of its officers. If it comes down from its position of sovereignty,
and enters the domain of commerce, it submits itself to the same laws that govern individuals
there." Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. 389,398 (1875).
In the eyes of Congress, the distinction continues to have vitality. See Dalehite v. United
States, 346 U.S. 15, 27 (1953), where referring to a tort claims amendment, the Supreme Court
said that "[w]hile Congress desired to waive the Government's immunity ... it was not con-
templated that the Government should be subject to liability arising from acts of a govern-
mental nature or function."
- 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947). It had earlier been stated that "It]he officers of the Fleet Cor-
poration may estop that corporation by their official conduct when the officers of the sovereign
by their conduct might not estop the government of the United States." Providence Engineer-
ing Corp. v. Downey Shipbuilding Corp., 294 Fed. 641, 660 (C.A. 2d, 1923).
- 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947). Mr. Justice Frankfurter adverted to Mr. justice Holmes's
dictum that "men must turn square corners when they deal with the Government." Ibid.,
at 385. But "the Government ought to turn square corners when dealing with its citizens."
Howbert v. Penrose, 38 F. 2d 577, 581 (C.A. 10th, 1930); Maguire and Zimet, Hobson's
Choice and Similar Practices in Federal Taxation, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1299 (1935). As
Mr. Justice Jackson put it: "[T]here is no reason why the square corners should constitute a
one-way street." Dissenting in 332 U.S. 380,388 (1947).
37 For immunity from estoppel because of lack of authority to waive the requirements
of a regulation, see Nichols & Co. v. Secretary of Agriculture, 131 F. 2d 651, 659 (C.A. 1st,
1942); Sternfeld v. United States, 32 F. 2d 789, 791 (N.D. N.Y., 1929); Bowles v. Lentin, 151
F. 2d 615, 618 (C.A. 7th, 1945).
,8 332 U.S. 380, 388 (1947).
1954]
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As Laski points out, the modern state is "in essence a public service cor-
poration"; like any other body, "it acts through servants who take deci-
sions in its name," and like any such body, it should "be responsible" for
the "torts," and, it may be added, the acts, of its servants. 9 But no
separation of powers doctrine complicates corporate delegations.
Though little explicit reliance on the separation of powers is to be found
in the cases, 4 judicial stress upon authority as the test of estoppel stems
from that doctrine. The analysis may be articulated as follows: Adminis-
trators are clothed with authority to act and make rules by the exercise
of legislative power; and such legislative power is exercisable only by
Congress.41 It cannot be exercised by an administrator; no administrator
may do that which is forbidden, 42 nor exercise a power that was withheld.
The fact that a citizen was injured by his action does not clothe an ad-
ministrator with legislative power, i.e., with the power to assume an
authority that has been withheld or prohibited. If this analysis is valid,
and if the touchstone of immunity from estoppel is the absence of authori-
ty, one must agree with Mr. Justice Frankfurter that "the form in which
Government functions" is of no moment. 43
31 Laski, Liberty in the Modern State 53-54 (1949). Section 161 of the Restatement of Agen-
cy (1935) states that: "A general agent for a disclosed or partially disclosed principal subjects
his principal to liability for acts done on his account which usually accompany or are inci-
dental to transactions which he is authorized to conduct if, although they are forbidden by the
principal, the other party reasonably believes that the agent is authorized to do them and has
no notice that the agent is not so authorized." See also Holmes, Collected Legal Papers 81
(1920).
40
n Langstaff v. Lucas, 9 F. 2d 691, 692 (W.D. Ky., 1925), the court based the govern-
ment's immunity from estoppel on the fact that the Treasury Department "[w]as not...
authorized. . . to exempt from income taxation. That power is vested in Congress.. . ." In
Municipality of Rio Piedras v. Serra, Garabis & Co., 65 F. 2d 691, 694 (C.A. 1st, 1932), the
court said that "[e]stoppel can never be invoked against the public to create power in an
officer who purported to act on behalf of the public without authority to do so." See Secu-
rities & Exchange Commission v. Torr, 22 F. Supp. 602, 612 (S.D. N.Y., 1938). .
41 Executive power is limited to the scope of the congressional grant. Little v. Barreme,
2 Cranch (U.S.) 170, 177-78 (1804). On this, all the Justices were united in the recent "steel
seizure" case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585, 602, 637-39, 660-
61, 662 (1952). As Mr. Justice Douglas, paraphrasing Black and Frankfurter, JJ., said: "[Tlhe
power to execute the laws starts and ends with the laws Congress has enacted." Ibid., at 633.
Acts of administrative bodies, indeed of courts as well, which go beyond the powers dele-
gated to them are void. Vallely v. Northern F. & M. Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 353-54 (1920);
General Broadcasting System v. Bridgeport Broadcasting Station, 53 F. 2d 664, 668 (D. Conn.,
1931); L. A. Tucker Truck Lines v. United States, 100 F. Supp. 432, 434 (E.D. Mo., 1951).
42 One "may not invoke an estoppel to obtain a license which the statute forbids." Middles-
boro Liquor & Wine Co. v. Berkshire, 133 F. 2d 39,41 (App. D.C., 1942). Compare Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's statement in Merrill v. Federal Crop Insurance Corp., 332 U.S. 380,384 (1947),
that an express statutory prohibition of insurance on reseeded wheat would make ignorance of
the restriction immaterial.
4 3 Merrill v. Federal Crop Insurance Corp., 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947). Notwithstanding the
Supreme Court's rejection of the governmental-proprietary distinction as a test of estoppel, it
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Such analysis may be logically satisfying, but the "pitiless conclu-
sion" prompts the query whether the courts have marched "under the
prod of a remorseless logic which is supposed to leave them no alterna-
tive." 44 For there has been a notable shift, in applying the separation of
powers, from inflexible abstractions to the lessons of experience, witness
the retreat from insistence on rigorous standards of delegation." It is
open to question whether the related restriction of administrators to the
jurisdiction conferred inexorably requires the sacrifice of the citizen who
relied on the official exercise of apparent authority.46
However the case may be with respect to "unauthorized" conduct,
estoppel clearly may be based upon "authorized" conduct. From the
Supreme Court's oft-repeated formulation of the immunity from estoppel
in terms of administrative action that "the law does not sanction or per-
mit," 47 it may be inferred that government is bound by actions within the
scope of the agent's authority. A steadily growing number of federal
courts have properly so held,48 for the sole tenable argument for the im-
continues to be drawn in the lower courts. See United States v. City and County of San
Francisco, 112 F. Supp. 451, 454 (N.D. Cal., 1953); Chapman v. Santa Fe Pac. R. Co., 198
F. 2d 498, 502, 519 (App. D.C., 1952) (dissenting opinion); Branch Banking & Trust Co. v.
United States, 98 F. Supp. 757, 766 (Ct. Cl., 1951).
44 Cardozo, Selected Writings 215 (1947).
46 Davis, Administrative Law, 27-31, 44-54 (1951); Willis, Three Approaches to Adminis-
trative Law, 4 Selected Essays on Constitutional Law 36, 54, 57 (1938); American Power &
Light Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946).
46 In considering the separation of powers it is well to remember that a "constitution was
made for the safety and protection of the people and not to be used as an instrument for their
destruction." Kneeland v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 454, 469-70 (1862) (Dixon, C.J.).
47 See note 31 supra.
48 "The acts or omissions of the officers of the government, if they be authorized to bind
the United States in a particular transaction, will work estoppel against the government, if
the officers have acted within the scope of their authority." Ritter v. United States, 28 F. 2d
265, 267 (C.A. 3d, 1928).
The following cases in accord are listed chronologically; a few have reference to state action.
Cahn v. Barnes, 5 Fed. 327, 334 (C.C. Ore., 1881); Indiana v. Milk, 11 Fed. 389, 397 (C.C.
Ind., 1882); United States v. Willamette V. & C. M. Wagon-Road Co., 54 Fed. 807,811 (C.C.
Ore., 1892); Michigan v. Jackson, L. &. S. R. Co., 69 Fed. 116, 123 (C.A. 6th, 1895); United
States v. Stinson, 125 Fed. 907, 910 (C.A. 7th, 1903); Walker v. United States, 139 Fed. 409,
413 (C.C. Ala., 1905); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Julian, 169 Fed. 166, 175 (C.C. Ala.,
1909); Hemmer v. United States, 204 Fed. 898, 902 (C.A. 8th, 1912); J. Homer Fritch, Inc. v.
United States, 236 Fed. 133, 134 (C.A. 9th, 1916); United States v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co.,
16 F. 2d 374, 376 (C.A. 8th, 1926); Dayton Airplane Co. v. United States, 21 F. 2d 673, 674
(C.A. 6th, 1927); Joseph Eichelberger & Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 88 F. 2d
874, 875 (C.A. 5th, 1937); United States v. Big Bend Transit Co., 42 F. Supp. 459, 474 (E.D.
Wash., 1941); Vestal v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 152 F. 2d 132, 135 (App. D.C.,
1945); United States v. Property on Pinto Island, 74 F. Supp. 92, 102 (S.D. Ala., 1947);
David J. Joseph Co. v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 345, 351 (Ct. Cl., 1949); compare Lindsey
v. Hawes, 2 Black (U.S.) 554, 560 (1862). For similar cases in the tax field, see notes 92 and 93
infra.
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munity derives from separation of powers considerations which have no
play where administrative action is authorized by Congress. In such case
the government should be and is estopped.
This analysis is no less applicable to the tax functions than to the other
functions of government. Nevertheless, in the tax field, the courts have
said that estoppel must be applied to the government with "great cau-
tion,"49 "in only the most extraordinary case."50 The ground upon which
this is put is the "necessity inherent in [the government's] sovereign power
of taxation." 51 The government must have money and, it has been sug-
gested, "can be sure of that money only if its tax scheme is stringent to
the point of potential injustice . ,,52 The fact. is, however, that tax col-
lection is not accomplished with the aid of thumbscrews, but rests for the
most part on mutual trust between the government and the taxpayers.53
Repudiation of tax rulings and interpretations damages that trust and
therefore impairs our voluntary tax payment system. Given administra-
tive authority to act, there should be no more hesitancy in applying
estoppel to the government's tax, than to its other, functions.
Similarly, the binding effect of an "election" of judicial remedies"4 may
likewise be explained by the plenary authority conferred on the Attorney
General and the United States Attorneys to prosecute and defend suits,-5
so that however mistaken the government's choice of a remedy, it is none-
theless binding. It is this authorization which also explains why the
49 Barnet Inv. Co. v. Nee, 72 F. Supp. 81, 82 (W.D. Mo., 1947); 10A Mertens, The Law of
Federal Income Taxation 189 (1948); Vestal v. Commissioner, 152 F. 2d 132, 136 (App. D.C.,
1945). In Elrod Slug Casting Mach. Co. v. O'Malley, 57 F. Supp. 915, 920 (D. Neb., 1944),
it was held that the "collection of revenues is a governmental function" to which estoppel
does not apply.
60 James Couzens v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 1040, 1151 (1928).
T Ibid. 5S Maguire and Zimet, op. cit. supra note 36, at 1302,
" "[T]he voluntary system of tax collection rolls on successfully, year after year. The BIR
is essentially a bookkeeping bureau. It cracks down occasionally, but its chief function is to
accept tax payments that United States citizens-private and corporate-line up willingly to
pay." What Hit Tax Collections, Business Week, No. 1245, July 11, 1953, pp. 25, 26.
54 United States v. Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 290 (1922).
"s 62 Stat. 910 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 507 (1949); cf. 45 Stat. 54 (1928), 5 U.S.C.A. § 309
(1949); 34 Stat. 816 (1906), 5 U.S.C.A. § 310 (1949). See Halbach v. Markham, 106 F. Supp.
475, 480 (D. N.J., 1952).
56 To be sure, the judicial explanation has been made in different terms. In United States v.
Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 290 (1922), the Court explained that "it is not admissible to
thus speculate upon the action of the court, and, having met with an adverse decision, to
again vex the defendant with another and inconsistent action upon the same facts." Ibid.,
at 296. But any government change of position after a citizen had acted on the prior position
to his detriment is equally "vexing." Yet if the earlier position was unauthorized, estoppel will
not lie. The rationalization of "election" must therefore be "authorized" conduct.
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government is estopped by the representations made by its counsel in the
course of judicial proceedings. 7 The several cases which appear to be
contra rest on readily distinguishable grounds and do not affect the con-
clusion that representations by government counsel in the courts are
binding on the government.
5 5
LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS, ADVICE AND RuLINGS
Binding effect is often denied to administrative rulings on the ground
that an interpretation of law cannot found an estoppel.59 Whatever the
merits of the rule that a "mistake of law" cannot ground equitable relief
between private parties,60 it is mechanical jurisprudence to apply this rule
5 7 United States v. Coast Wineries, 131 F. 2d 643,650 (C.A. 9th, 1942); First National Bank
v. United States, 2 F. Supp. 107, 109 (E.D. Mo., 1932). In the Wineries case, the court placed
its decision upon the ground that unless the court could rely upon statements and stipulations
of government counsel, there would "be delay and confusion which would be seriously detri-
mental to the orderly administration of justice." 131 F. 2d 643, 650 (C.A. 9th, 1942). "Orderly
administration" would inadequately explain how government counsel could be permitted by
his action in court to forfeit federal land which, for example, the Secretary of the Interior
was forbidden to transfer. The explanation must reside in the fact that counsel has plenary
authority to conduct the suit.
-1 In Carr v. United States, 98 U.S. 433 (1879), government counsel appeared for federal
officers sued in their "individual" capacity, and it was held that the United States was not
estopped by their appearance. This is the doctrine of United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 222
(1882); cf. Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 739 (1947), recently characterized as "a patent prosti-
tution" of the government immunity from suit doctrine in Land v. Dollar, 190 F. 2d 366,
375 (App. D.C., 1951). In United States v. Javier, 22 F. 2d 879, 880 (App. D.C., 1927), it
was held that "the United States is not estopped by an order of naturalization, although ...
it had entered its appearance in the naturalization proceeding and there unsuccessfully raised
the same objection." Reliance was placed in part upon United States v. Ness, 245 U.S. 319
(1917). There it is explained that Section 11 of the Naturalization Act which authorizes the
United States to appear in opposition in a naturalization proceeding, and Section 15 which
authorizes it to bring suit to set aside a certificate of naturalization, are "cumulative," and
that Congress intended by Section 11 "to aid the court of naturalization in arriving at a
correct decision and so to minimize the necessity for independent suits under § 15." Ibid.,
at 327. The naturalization cases therefore represent a statutory exemption from the rule that
an appearance in court binds the government.
51Ross v. Commissioner, 169 F. 2d 483, 496 (C.A. 1st, 1948) (per Frankfurter, Cir. J.);
Sturm v. Boker, 150 U.S. 312, 336 (1893); Commissioner v. American Light and Traction
Co., 125 F. 2d 365, 366 (C.A. 7th, 1942); 10A Mertens, The Law of Federal Income Taxa-
tion 156 (1948). In Holmes's phrase, the rule is "an instance of an early statement ossifying by
repetition into an absolute principle ..... 1 Holmes-Laski Letters 335 (1953).
60 Criticisms of the rule are collected in Maguire and Zimet, op. cit. supra note 36, at 1304;
Mistake of Law: A Suggested Rationale, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 336 (1931). See also Staten Island
Hygeia Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. United States, 85 F. 2d 68, 71 (C.A. 2d, 1936). Consult
Chafee, Cases on Equitable Remedies 649 et seq. (1939), for a comprehensive collection of
materials on "mistake of law." 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 849 (5th ed., 1941), con-
cluded that the "great majority of courts" give relief for mistakes as to a person's "own ante-
cedent existing legal rights" and that such mistakes "may be properly regarded-as in great
measure they really are, and may be dealt with, as mistakes of fact. Courts have constantly
felt and acted upon this view, though not always avowedly." See also Order of United Com-
mercial Travelers v. McAdam, 125 Fed. 358,368 (C.A. 8th, 1903).
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to a pronouncement of law by a public officer charged with administering
and interpreting a statute.
Apparently the rule proceeded from the facile assumption that "every
man must be taken to be cognizant of the law."'" But the maxim that
ignorance of the law may not be pleaded in excuse of a crime had earlier
been rejected in a civil case 62 and the presumption that everyone knows
the law is now discredited. 63
Noting that reasons for the rule have "never been adequately stated"6 4
and searching for a rationalization, one commentator has suggested that
the rule seeks to preclude possible fraud since for evidence of mistake of
law we are usually left to the word of the complainant himself. Since,
moreover, it is difficult for a jury to assay a man's past motives and the
degree of certainty with which he previously regarded the legal signifi-
cance of a specific set of facts, it was suggested that an arbitrary rule of
thumb excluding mistake of law is justified.65 But such considerations are
irrelevant where, for example, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has
promulgated a ruling or rendered a written interpretation to a taxpayer;
in such a case strong policy considerations dictate that the Commissioner
be bound by his opinions.66 A taxpayer is entitled to rely on the interpre-
6 t Bilbie v. Lumley, 2 East. *469, 470, 472 (K.B., 1802); see Mistake of Law: A Suggested
Rationale, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 336,337 (1931).
6Lansdown v. Lansdown, Mosely *364, 365 (1730). It is one thing to reject ignorance as
an excuse by one who has committed a wrong; it is something else again to employ the rejec-
tion as an instrument of inflicting a loss or hurt.
63 The very existence of courts of appeal, said Justice Maule, shows that even "judges may
be ignorant of law." Martindale v. Falkner, 2 C.B. *706, 720 (C.P., 1846). And, he declared,
"[tihere is no presumption in this country that every person knows the law. It would be
contrary to common sense and reason." Ibid., at 719. See also Montriou v. Jefferys, 2 C. & P.
*113, 116 (N.P., 1825).
6Mistake of Law: A Suggested Rationale, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 336, 337 (1931). "[Wlhat,"
asked Professor Keener, "is the public policy which demands that one who has done no injury,
but simply seeks to avert a loss, shall, because of his ignorance of law, suffer a loss?" Keener,
Quasi-Contracts 91 (1893). As a matter of analysis, "[t]he mind no more assents to the payment
made under a mistake of the law, than if made under a mistake of the facts; the delusion is
the same in both cases; in both alike, the mind is influenced by false motives." Northrop v.
Graves, 19 Conn. 548, 554 (1849).
65 Mistake of Law: A Suggested Rationale, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 336, 337-41 (1931).
66 Policy arguments are advanced by Magill, Finality of Determinations of the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, 28 Col. L. Rev. 563, 575-76 (1928): "The unsettling effects of
the repeated reopening of tax cases thought settled; the expense of repeated presentations of
involved facts and legal arguments; the confusion and delays in the Treasury caused by the
failure to dispose of old cases once for all caunot be too strongly deprecated.... The rapidly
changing provisions of- the revenue laws, grounded on little or no actual experience, call for a
reasonable finality of interpretation if chaos is to be avoided... ." Indeed the Commissioner,
recognizing the shock to public confidence, has himself halted the repudiation of prior legal
rulings. See page 693 infra.
"[lit must be considered an intolerable operation, after the State, through its duly consti-
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tation of the officer to whom the task of interpretation is confided; he
should not be at the peril of guessing whether courts will ultimately reject
the interpretation.6 7 Indeed, Congress itself has said that "sound adminis-
tration.., places upon the Government the responsibility and burden
of interpreting the law...."68 Even in private law, equity will relieve
from a "mistake of law," if it was reasonable for the plaintiff "to rely
upon the presumably greater knowledge of the defendant. ' 69 So far as
the "mistake of law" rule is concerned, it would seem that an interpreta-
tion of law by a duly authorized officer should estop the government.
The question next arises, whether the interpretations of a subordinate
should be given as much effect as an authoritative agency interpretation.
To my mind, the interpretation of statutes and regulations cannot be
placed at the hazard of varying and conflicting interpretations by hun-
dreds, perhaps thousands of subordinates, widely scattered over the na-
tion. One who seeks an authoritative interpretation, common sense would
suggest, should address himself to the head of the agency.70 The recent
proposal for legislative correction goes no further than to seek conclusive-
ness for authorized administrative interpretations.7'
Legal advice, concerning the effect of a given transaction, for example,
as distinguished from an interpretation of a statute or regulation, requires
a different approach. The Technical Staff of the Bureau of Internal Reve-
nue advises, for example, that for tax purposes no trust came into being.72
Or similar advice is rendered by a field agent. Unified administration, it is
true, would be facilitated if all such legal questions were authoritatively
answered by a designated, central voice. But administration would
founder if every such question would be postponed for an answer from
tuted organs, has pronounced a rule of law upon which the citizen relies when, later, the
State, through the same organs, takes away from that citizen the rights or liberties which
he has fashioned in reliance on what has been officially declared." Kocourek and Koven, Reno-
vation of the Common Law Through Stare Decisis, 29 111. L. Rev. 971, 972 (1935). See also note
108 infra.
67 Maguire and Zimet, op. cit. supra note 36, at 1291-92.
Quoted infra, page 700.
69 Staten Island Hygeia Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. United States, 85 F. 2d 68, 71 (C.A. 2d,
1936); Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland v. McQuade, 123 F. 2d 337,339 (App. D.C.,
1941).
70 Compare the procedure for obtaining official interpretations provided by the Office of
Price Administration. Bowles v. Indianapolis Glove Co., 150 F. 2d 597, 601 (C.A. 7th, 1945).
7 Newman, op. cit. supra note 13, at 382-83.
72 Gilmer v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 887 (S.D. Tex., 1950).
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that voice. Taxation is "eminently practical" 3 It has to do with matters,
"the great majority of which ought to be and usually are, disposed of in-
formally... ." -14 Such dispositions should be encouraged, not vitiated.
In this area, the attitude of the courts has been too grudging. One need
only recall one court's flippant dismissal of the Bureau Solicitor's advice
-that on the facts the taxpayers were operating as a partnership and
"would not be subject to the corporation tax"15-as a "careless and un-
official expression of opinion" 76 Another striking illustration is furnished
by United States v. Globe Indemnity Co.7" There a surety had furnished a
bond for a taxpayer. After a series of dealings with the taxpayer, the Col-
lector of Internal Revenue, in response to the taxpayer's request, certified
that "there are no unpaid income taxes appearing on the records of this
office in your name. . ".7."18 On the faith of this letter the surety returned
the collateral to the taxpayer. Thereafter, the government sued the surety
for unpaid taxes. The court declared that "[t]here would seem to have
been no authority on the part of the collector to furnish a tax search bind-
ing on the Commissioner. '7 9 What more natural than to turn to the Col-
lector to whom taxes have been paid for advice whether any further
73 Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 503 (1930).
74 Hartwell Mills v. Rose, 61 F. 2d 441, 444 (C.A. 5th, 1932).
76 F. E. McGlone v. Commissioner, 22 B.T.A. 358, 362 (1932), reviewed in Commissioner
v. Duckwitz, 68 F. 2d 629 (C.A. 7th, 1934).
76 Commissioner v. Duckwitz, 68 F. 2d 629, 630 (C.A. 7th, 1934). Compare the Office of
Price Administration regulation which authorizes official interpretations to be signed by the
General Counsel, any Associate or Assistant General Counsel, or Regional Price Attorney.
Quoted in Newman, op. cit. supra note 13, at 382.
77 94 F. 2d 576 (C.A. 2d, 1938). Compare Burnham Chemical Co. v. Krug, 81 F. Supp. 911
(D. D.C., 1949), where a "responsible official of the Department of Interior" "discouraged"
the claimant from taking a departmental appeal to the Secretary of the Interior. Judicial relief
was denied because claimant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and because the
government was not estopped by the subordinates' advice to plead exhaustion. Exhaustion is
not a creature of statute, but of equity. Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 48
Yale L.J. 981, 985-86 (1939). In weighing the need for compliance with its own rule, a court
of equity surely may weigh the equities. No statute forbade the "responsible official" to advise
the claimant with respect to a matter of departmental procedure.
78 94 F. 2d 576, 577 (C.A. 2d, 1938). It may be noted that this case involves a repudiation
of an earlier determination of fact, as did Lee v. Munroe, 7 Cranch (U.S.) 366 (1813). If there
is "authority" to make such determinations, analysis of the immunity from estoppel is not
advanced by distinguishing them from determinations of law. In the case of legal inter-
pretations and regulations, the necessity of harmonizing with the "clear" language of a
statute is a special aspect of the authority question. See page 699 infra.
79 94 F. 2d 576, 578 (C.A. 2d, 1938). Compare Darling v. Commissioner, 49 F. 2d 111, 113
(C.A. 4th, 1931), where a revenue agent's advice that a taxpayer should not take a loss in 1918
until the business of the company was a closed transaction, was held unauthorized. In Searles
Real Estate Trust, 25 B.T.A. 1115, 1122 (1932), a revenue agent's advice that the filing of a
belated return was unnecessary, was likewise held unauthorized.
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taxes are owing? And on whom may a taxpayer more properly rely for
legal advice than on the Solicitor, the chief legal officer of the Bureau?
When, for example, the Bureau offers the assistance of its agents to the
public in the preparation of income tax returns, it is unsound adminis-
tration to repudiate such advice as unauthorized. It is submitted that
unless such advice is expressly forbidden by statute or regulation, the
courts should find the authority implied. The necessities of government
render impracticable a statutory authorization for every act performed
by an administrator, as was emphasized by justice McLean more than
100 years ago:
A practical knowledge of the action of any one of the great departments of the gov-
ernment must convince every person that the head of a department, in the distribu-
tion of its duties and responsibilities, is often compelled to exercise his discretion. He
is limited in the exercise of his powers by the law; but it does not follow that he must
show a statutory provision for everything he does. No government could be adminis-
tered on such principles. To attempt to regulate by law the minute movements of
every part of the complicated machinery of government would evince a most un-
pardonable ignorance on the subject. Whilst the great outlines of its movements
may be marked out, and limitations imposed on the exercise of its powers, there are
numberless things which must be done that can neither be anticipated nor defined,
and which are essential to the proper action of the government.80
Such considerations are no less applicable to the effective functioning of
subordinates to whom power is of necessity delegated.
Let it not be concluded, however, that the rulings of agency heads have
received much more respect as a basis of estoppel than have those issued
by their subordinates. So, in Washington Market Co. v. Commissioner,8 the
taxpayer "found a written ruling [by the Commissioner], rendered after
full hearings to be only a scrap of paper. '8 2 In Boykin v., Commissioner,s3
the Commissioner insisted upon treating a tenancy in common as an en-
tire taxable interest for purposes of estate tax, but was permitted to
change his position to the detriment of the surviving wife for purposes of
income taxes. Perhaps the most noted change of position, sustained in
Couzens v. Commissioner,4 involved a change in the Commissioner's
valuation of Ford Motor Co. minority stock after Couzens sold his shares.
It is this case, we are told by a recent Chief Counsel of the Bureau, which
"did little to instill public faith and confidence in the Bureau," that led
80 United States v. MacDaniel, 7 Pet. (U.S.) 1, 14-15 (1833).
8125 B.T.A. 576 (1932).
82Maguire and Zimet, op. cit. supra note 36, at 1308 n. 92. The Commissioner was per-
mitted to reverse his ruling that no taxable gain or loss had been realized by reason of certain
transactions. Washington Market Co. v. Commissioner, 25 B.T.A. 576, 581 (1932).
8316 B.T.A. 477 (1929). 8411 B.T.A. 1040 (1928).
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to the Bureau's present policy of honoring its rulings. 8 This belated rec-
ognition of the "policy of fair play"8 6 finds support in case law that has yet
to be repudiated.
But the precedents denying the power of an officer to overrule the
authorized determination or ruling of a predecessor, which may be said
to constitute the common law on the subject, have been given scant con-
sideration by the courts. A review of the early cases will furnish a back-
ground against which to construe the statutory provisions which have
been deemed to empower the Commissioner to overrule his predecessors.
In 1841, the Supreme Court, considering the right of a Postmaster
General to disallow an allowance made by his predecessor within the
scope of his authority, held that the
right in an incumbent of reviewing a predecessor's decisions extends to mistakes in
matters of fact arising from errors of calculation, and to cases of rejected claims in
which material testimony is afterwards discovered and produced. But if a credit has
been given, or an allowance made, as these were, by the head of a Department, and it
is alleged to be an illegal allowance, the judicial tribunals of the country must be re-
sorted to, to construe the law under which the allowance was made.... It is no
longer a case between the correctness of one officer's judgment and that of his suc-
cessor. A third party is interested, and he cannot be deprived of a payment or a credit
so given, but by the intervention of a Court to pass upon his right.87
The rule is reiterated in a series of Supreme Court cases,"" among them
United States v. Kaufman,"9 which held that the allowance of a tax refund
by the Commissioner could only be impeached for fraud or mistake, and
that, not administratively. Citing these decisions, a district court held
that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is without authority to re-
verse his predecessor's determination of a question of fact, 0 and another
district judge declared that "[a]ny-other conclusion would bring chaos in
governmental administration and cause untold annoyance to our citi-
zens."
91
8Wenchel, Taxpayer's Rulings, 5 Tax. L. Rev. 105, 112, 113-14, 115 (1950). The policy
has been in effect for more than a decade. Ibid., at 113.
."Ibid., at 115. It has "been the unvarying policy of the Bureau for a decade or more."
Ibid.
87 United States v. Bank of the Metropolis, 15 Pet. (U.S.) 377, 401 (1841).
88 Stone v. United States, 2 Wall. (U.S.) 525, 535 (1864) (successor cannot annul patent
issued by his predecessor); United States v. Real Estate Savings Bank, 104 U.S. 728, 733-34
(1882) (allowance of claim by Commissioner can only be impeached in court for fraud or mis-
take); cf. United States v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 287 U.S. 144 (1932).
89 96 U.S. 567 (1878). 90 Penrose v. Skinner, 278 Fed. 284, 286 (D. Colo., 1921).
91Penrose v. Skinner, 298 Fed. 335, 337 (D. Colo., 1923).-See also note 66 supra. Compare
a consul's absence of implied power to revoke a visa once issued to an alien, United States
v. Reimer, 101 F. 2d 267, 269 (C.A. 2d, 1939), on the ground that it would "involve the pos-
session of an essentially arbitrary discretion."
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In a number of subsequent tax cases, some courts have denied both the
power of the Commissioner to change the position taken by a predeces-
sor 92 and his power to change his own position.93 Other courts have taken
a contrary view,94 traceable ultimately to an article published in 1928 by
Professor Magill.915 The views there expressed have been so influential as
to require detailed examination.
Magill sought to distinguish a number of opinions of Attorneys General
as well as some lower court decisions "indicating that an administrative
officer may not reverse the action of his predecessor, even for an erroneous
construction of the law .... ,,"6 There is no occasion to dwell on these
opinions and decisions,9 7 for the Supreme Court cases here discussed
contain no intimation that the distinguishing factors stressed by Magill
played any role.
92H. S. D. Co. v. Kavanagh, 191 F. 2d 831, 846 (C.A. 6th, 1951); Stockstrom v. Com-
missioner, 190 F. 2d 283, 288-89 (App. D.C., 1951); Woodworth v. Kales, 26 F. 2d 178, 181(C.A. 6th, 1928); Boyne City Lumber Co. v. Doyle, 47 F. 2d 772, 774 (D. Mich., 1930).
"1 Vestal v. Commissioner, 152 F. 2d 132, 136-37 (App. D.C., 1945); Norton Coe v. Com-
missioner, 50 F. 2d 664, 669 (C.A. 1st, 1931); see Wurtsbaugh v. Commissioner, 187 F. 2d 975,
977 (C.A. 5th, 1951); United States v. Brown, 86 F. 2d 798 (C.A. 6th, 1936); Joseph Eichel-
berger & Co. v. Commissioner, 88 F. 2d 875 (C.A. 5th, 1937); United States v. Borg-Warner
Corporation, 108 F. 2d 424,428 (C.A. 7th, 1939); Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 9 F. Supp.
590, 601 (Ct. Cl., 1935); Potter v. Fahs, 71 F. Supp. 675, 678 (S.D. Fla., 1947). See also note
117 infra.
We set to one side the cases holding that a prior interpretation of law is not binding on
the Commissioner. See authorities cited note 59 supra.
Mclahenny v. Commissioner, 39 F. 2d 356 (C.A. 3d, 1930); Burnet v. Porter, 283 U.S.230 (1931); Page v. Lafayette Worsted Co., 66 F. 2d 339 (C.A. 1st, 1933); L. Loewy & Son
v. Commissioner, 31 F. 2d 652 (C.A. 2d, 1929); Knapp-Monarch Co. v. Commissioner, 139
F. 2d 863 (C.A. 8th, 1944); Tonnigsen v. Commissioner, 61 F. 2d 199 (C.A. 9th, 1932); Stan-
ford University Book Store v. Helvering, 83 F. 2d 710 (App. D.C., 1936); Washington Market
Co. v. Commissioner, 25 B.T.A. 576 (1932).
"96Magill, op. cit. supra note 66. 96 Ibid., at 568.
97 Magill stated with respect to some of them that Congress had "conferred the power
to determine a claim upon a particular individual; thereby inferentially at least precluding a
review by his successor," and that the underlying policy was that there "was no statute of
limitations to prevent an indefinite succession of reopenings .... " Ibid., at 568. These factors
played no role in the Supreme Court cases earlier cited. Other cases are distinguished by Magill
on the ground that interests in patents or land "had been vested by the act of the former ad-
ministrative officer." Ibid. In Stone v. United States, 2 Wall. (U.S.) 525, 535 (1860), the Court
indicated that even a patent "void for want of authority" could not be annulled by a successor.
Such void patent in legal contemplation never "vests" title. Compare note 41 supra. Finally,
Magill urges that an administrative decision that an admiral was not in the naval service at
a given time and a Commissioner's decision, setting the value of Ford Motor Co. stock at a
given time, exhibit such "tremendous differences in the facts ... and in the potential effect of
the two decisions" as to counsel "that a legal analogy between the cases should not be lightly
drawn." 28 Col. L. Rev. 563, 573 (1928). To the contrary, we submit, the fact that the Ford
decision shook public confidence in the Commissioner (page 693 supra) and that such a tax de-
cision adversely affected the rights of others similarly situated indicates that the reversal of a
tax decision has less to commend it than that of a decision concerning an Admiral's standing.
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A more weighty argument to support the view that the Commissioner
may overrule a predecessor is based by Magill upon the fact that the
Internal Revenue statute, in providing that a "closing agreement" shall
be "final and conclusive," furnished the exclusive mechanism for finality. 8
This argument was adopted in Mcllhenny v. Commissioner, expressed in
terms of the rule that "when a statute limits a thing to be done in a par-
ticular way, it includes a negative of any other mode."99
Mechanical reliance on rules of construction has given way to the view
that they "are not rules of law but merely axioms of experience.... They
do not solve the special difficulties in construing a particular statute." 00
Then, too, there is competition amongst such rules. In the presence of a
long line of cases precluding the reversal of a predecessor's determination,
the court, for example, might well have concluded, as did the Supreme
Court, in Transcontinental 6e Western Air v. Civil Aeronautics Board,'
that Congress, in enacting the "closing agreement" provision, had not
plainly exhibited any intention to "make a radical break with tradition,"
or that Congress had not "clearly" shown an intention to depart from
the common law.
0 2
9" 28 Col. L. Rev. 563, 567 n. 27 (1928). This provision is now found in 53 Stat. 462 (1939).
26 U.S.C.A. § 3760 (1940).
Still another argument by Magill is that the definition of a "deficiency" [now contained in
53 Stat. 82 (1939), 26 U.S.C.A. §271 (1945)] "contemplates the possibility of previous determi-
nations." 28 Col. L. Rev. 563, 567 (1928). The then provision that the deficiency shall "first be
increased by the amounts previously assessed... as a deficiency, and decreased by the amounts
previously abated. . . ," quoted by Magill, ibid., at 568, indicates, however, that past ad-
ministrative action in this regard must be respected. Moreover, recognition of the mere
"possibility of previous determinations" does not clearly disclose a purpose to depart from the
common-law rule which precludes a successor from overruling the determination of a pred-
ecessor.
99 39 F. 2d 356, 358 (C.A. 3d, 1930); see also L. Loewy & Sons v. Commissioner, 31 F. 2d
652, 654 (C.A. 2d, 1929); Knapp-Monarch Co. v. Commissioner, 139 F. 2d 863, 864 (C.A. 8th,
1944). Cf. Burnet v. Porter, 283 U.S. 230, 231 (1931).
100 United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221 (1953); Springer v.
Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 206 (1928); United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86,93 (1941).
Compare the pioneer utterance of Chief Justice Doe: "Legal rules of construction, so called,
suggest natural methods of finding and weighing the evidence and ascertaining the fact of
intention, but do not determine the weight which the evidence has in the mind, and do not es-
tablish a conclusion at variance with that reached by a due consideration of all the compe-
tent proof." Edes v. Boardman, 58 N.H. 580, 592 (1879). Compare cases cited note 127 infra.
101336 U.S. 601 (1949). There retroactive effect was denied to a provision authorizing the
Board "to make such rates effective from such date as it shall determine to be proper" on the
ground that traditionally rate-making is prospective and because the Court found no "[n-
gressional purpose to make a radical break with tradition" and was therefore "most reluctant
to give the 'make effective' clause the broad meaning [of retroactivity] which petitioner
urges." Ibid., at 605.
102 Northern Securities Co. v. United Stated, 193 U.S. 197, 361 (1904) (Brewer, J., con-
curring); Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101 U.S. 557, 565 (1880); Jones v. Jones, 72 F. 2d 829 (App.
D.C., 1934). That the "expressio unius" rule does not foreclose the matter may be gathered
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That intention, it may be thought, can be found in an extract from the
legislative history of the "closing agreement" provision, first noted by
Magill:
Under the present method of procedure, a taxpayer never knows when he is through,
as a tax case may be opened at any time because of a change in ruling by the Treasury
Department. 103
This statement does not reflect the law as expressed in the Supreme
Court cases earlier discussed, but rather the Treasury procedure, contrary
to that law. At most, it therefore expresses a Congressional misapprehen-
sion of existing law to which little weight would attach.0 More significant
is the legislative statement accompanying the provisions in the same Act
respecting retroactivity of regulations, which is in pari materia, whereby
Congress unequivocally exhibited its intention to relieve taxpayers who
relied upon existing practices of the inequities of retroactive charges and
to make the government responsible for interpretations upon which tax-
payers may rely.105
RETROACTIVITY OF NEW REGuLATIONS
Reliance upon a regulation promulgated by the head of an agency, one
would think, should be free from the doubts that surround reliance on a
subordinate's interpretation. Yet such confidence too may prove costly to
the citizen. It is all too easy to explain retroactive displacement of an old
regulation by a new one in terms of a "continuing rule-making" power, 06
or of the absence of power to commit the government to a mistaken inter-
from Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929), where, in a parallel
situation, the Supreme Court was at pains to save the question whether an agreement by sub-
ordinates outside the statutory mechanism, "though not binding in itself, may when executed
become, under some circumstances, binding on the parties by estoppel."
103 Report of Committee on Finance on the Revenue Bill of 1921, Report No. 275, 67th
Cong. 1st Sess. 31 (1921), quoted by Magill, op. cit. supra note 66, at 567 n. 26.
104In Salomon Bros. & Hutzler v. Pedrick, 105 F. Supp. 210, 213 (S.D. N.Y., 1952), the
Congress had enacted a law adopting a view contrary to the prior Bureau interpretation, but
stated in a Report that "under the present law," the law was as the Bureau interpreted it. The
court held that "such reference to the 'present law' in the Committee Reports is not final nordispositive. A mere reference to what the 'law' presently is, in a Committee Report, is not
necessarily accurate nor always free from error."
I's These legislative materials are discussed at page 700 infra.
"Instead of balancing the various generalized axioms of experience [i.e., rules of construc-
tion], in construing legislation, regard for the specific history of the legislative process that
culminated in the Act now before us affords more solid ground for giving it appropriate mean-
ing." United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 222 (1952).See also Magill's citation to provisions indicating "a legislative desire to prevent repeated
reopenings of tax cases," note 108 infra.
106 Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90, 100 (1939).
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pretation,1°7 or, as Professor Magill suggested, of the Commissioner's
duty to collect taxes due which compels him to reverse an erroneous in-
terpretation.'08 But these are shaky conclusions. Was the Commissioner
in contemplation of law necessarily "wrong the first time"? 109
Suppose that the displaced regulations represent a contemporaneous
construction of the statute. Such interpretations carry "great weight."" 0
Given an ambiguous statute, a regulation that is substantially contem-
poraneous with the statute is regarded as evidence of the probable general
understanding of the times and of the opinions of men "who probably were
active in the drafting of the statute.""' From Mr. Justice Story onwards,
the Supreme Court has yielded its doubts in the face of a long-continued
administrative construction;" 2 it has considered that construction "bind-
ing on past transactions";'" it has viewed "with disfavor" a retroactive
change which would work injury upon those who relied upon a former con-
107 Schafer v. Helvering, 83 F. 2d 317, 320 (App. D.C., 1939). See also Commissioner v.
American Light & Traction Co., 125 F. 2d 365,366 (C.A. 7th, 1942).
108 Magill states that the "Commissioner's dity to collect taxes due would compel him to
reverse a prior ruling of law in a particular case, if he concluded it was an erroneous interpre-
tation." Magill, op. cit. supra note 66, at 568. (Emphasis added.) This was put upon the then
provision that the "Commissioner... shall make... the determinations and assessments of
all taxes .... " Ibid., at 564 n. 7. Parenthetically, today the Commissioner merely has "gen-
eral superintendence of the assessment and collection of all taxes. . . ." 53 Stat. 477 (1940), 26
U.S.C.A. § 3901 (1947). The word "shall" is as often permissive as mandatory, and given
the huge volume of tax collections, a large area of discretion in the re-"determination" and
re-"assessment" of taxes must necessarily reside in the Commissioner, a necessity which bars
the notion of mandatory duty. More important, the administrators themselves recognize no
such duty once they have given a ruling, for they adhere thereto "even where a Supreme
Court decision changes the Bureau's previous interpretation of the law, and such change oper-
ates to the benefit of the Government.... ." Wenchel, op. cit. supra note 85, at 115. Despite
the "duty to collect taxes that are due," Magill himself states that "a reasonable finality of
interpretation" is called for "if chaos is to be avoided," that "at the very least it would seem
that there should be a considerable reluctance to reopen old cases, in the absence of fraud, a
material mistake in fact, a controlling court decision, or perhaps a serious error in the inter-
pretation of the law. The provisions for a formal declaration from which the tdxpayer can
appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals; the provision denying the Commissioner power to make
a redetermination for a particular year where an appeal has been taken for that year; the pro-
vision authorizing final statement; all indicate a legislative desire to prevent repeated re-
openings of tax cases. A decent respect may properly be paid to this desire.... ." Magill,
op. cit. supra note 66, at 575.
109 Stockstrom v. Commissioner, 190 F. 2d 283, 289 (App. D.C., 1951) (Prettyman, J.,
dissenting).
n
0 United States v. American Trucking Association, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 549 (1940);
Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294,315 (1933).
M White v. Winchester Country Club, 315 U.S. 32, 41 (1942); Augustus v. Commissioner,
118 F. 2d 38 (C.A. 6th, 1941); Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 Harv.
L. Rev. 398, 405 (1941).
22 United States v. State Bank of North Carolina, 6 Pet. (U.S.) 29, 39-40 (1832).
us United States v. MacDaniel, 7 Pet. (U.S.) 1, 15 (1833).
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struction;" 4 and it has said that such a construction "ought not to be dis-
turbed now unless it be plainly wrong."" 5 Indeed, a long-continued con-
struction under a statute which Congress has left untouched is said to
have the force of law. 6 If the courts are thus under a duty to swallow
their doubts when confronted by a contemporaneous construction of an
ambiguous statute, all the less should the Commissioner or any other
officer be permitted to turn interpretive somersaults.n7 In such case, sure-
ly, the Court, in choosing between the earlier and later regulations, is no
less free than it formerly was in determining what the state law was"8
when it held that "where gross injustice would be otherwise done," the
federal courts would follow "the earlier [state decisions] rather than the
later decisions as to what it was."" 9
Against this, it has been argued that Section 3791(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code authorizes retroactive regulations. Section 3791(b)
authorizes the Commissioner to "prescribe the extent, if any, to which any
114 United States v. Alabama G.S.R. Co., 142 U.S. 615, 621 (1892).
115 Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 580, 583 (1930). See also Griswold, op.
cit. supra note 111, at 409. In the tax field, there is the additional rule that doubts in the con-
struction of a tax statute are resolved in favor of the taxpayer. Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151,153 (1917); Cloister Printing Corp. v. United States, 100 F. 2d 355, 357 (C.A. 2d, 1938).
116 "Acquiescence by Congress in an administrative practice may be an inference from
silence during a period of years." Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288U.S. 294,313 (1933) (per Cardozo, J.). See also Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938);
Stout v. Hancock, 146 F. 2d 741, 744 (C.A. 4th, 1944).
"1 Courts are not bound to give retrospective effect to a regulation not retroactive in terms
though the Commissioner announced he would give it retroactive effect. Kay v. Commissioner,
178 F. 2d 772 (C.A. 3d, 1950). Compare the rejection of an additional tax "based upon a theory
at variance with established administrative interpretation." United Fruit Co. v. Hassett, 61
F. Supp. 1013, 1019 (D. Mass., 1945), and see requirement that published ruling be repealed
by formal action and publication, and note rejection of departure from ruling prior thereto
in James v. Germania Iron Co., 107 Fed. 597, 609-10 (C.A. 8th, 1901).
In Hirshon v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 444,445 (Ct. Cl., 1953), the Court said: "[Tihe
Bureau itself, for two years after its enactment, interpreted the statute as making these taxes
deductible.... Then, without amendment of the statute, or the publication of any Treasury
Regulation, we have the Bureau issuing an I.T. which says the opposite. As we understand
it, an I.T. is an instruction issued to the staff of the Bureau, as to how the law should be ad-
ministered by the staff. The Bureau has no power to make law by such an instruction, even to
the extent that the Secretary of the Treasury may make law by regulation."
11 Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. (U.S.) 175 (1863).
119 Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444, 452 (1924). The Supreme Court has indicated
that "it may reject an established administrative practice when it conflicts with an earlier
one and is not supported by valid reasons ..... Sanford's Estate v. Commissioner, 308 U.S.
39, 53 (1939).
11053 Stat. 467 (1939), 26 U.S.C.A. § 3791 (1940); consult Magill, op. cit. supra note 66,
at 570-71 for predecessor section. See also Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commission-
er, 76 F. 2d 892, 897 (C.A. 2d, 1935). It is worth noting that the predecessor statute to which
Magill refers was expressly couched in terms of "the discretion of the Commissioner." Magill,
op. cit. supra note 66, at 570. That phrase is absent from § 3791(b).
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ruling, regulation... shall be applied without retroactive effect." Al-
though the literal terms suggest recognition of the existence of retroactive
regulations,'21 the legislative history of this provision discloses an inten-
tion to curb retroactivity. The Conference Committee stated with respect
to the predecessor of Section 3791(b) that:
It is hoped that this provision will prevent the constant reopening of cases on account
of changes in regulations or Treasury decisions, and it is believed that sound adminis-
"tration properly places upon the Government the responsibility and burden of interpret-
ing the law and of prescribing regulations upon which the taxpayers may rely.ln
The Supreme Court noted that the Committee Reports respecting the
1934 amendment of this provision stated that it "was intended to permit
the Treasury to avoid inequities to persons who had closed transactions in
reliance upon existing practice .... 23 Thus the Congress plainly mani-
fested its intention to relieve taxpayers who relied upon "existing prac-
tice" of retroactive inequities and to compel the government to prescribe
regulations upon which taxpayers may rely. In the words of the Supreme
Court, Section 3791(b) and its predecessors were designed to relieve the
Treasury from the view that "each change in administrative construction
must be given retroactive effect," a view that "deprived both the Govern-
ment and the taxpayer of any assurance that cases once settled would
stay settled."
124
The Bureau, for upwards of ten years, has not retroactively applied
changes in rulings, also a component of Section 3791(b), "even where a
Supreme Court decision changes the Bureau's previous interpretation of
the law. .. ,"2 This course has been followed under the "policy of fair
play, ' ' 2s but, it is suggested, this is tantamount to a long-continued ad-
ministrative construction of Section 3971(b), a construction that gives ef-
fect to the legislative history. If this falls short of a settled administrative
construction, the courts ought nonetheless to give effect to the plainly dis-
121 For present purposes, it is unnecessary to determine whether this section authorizes
the issuance of retroactive regulations as Magill suggests, op. cit. supra note 66, at 570-71, and
aslHelveringv. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110,116 (1939), would seem to indicate.
It suffices that the literal terms imply recognition of the existence of such a power. Surrey,
The Scope and Effect of Treasury Regulations Under the Income, Estate and Gift Taxes,
88 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 556, 567 (1940); and see Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 397 n. 49
(1943): "Thus it appears that this legislation was intended to permit escape from the retro-
active effects of administrative action by the Treasury, rather than to increase its power to
make retroactive rulings."
122H.R. Rep. No. 1882, 70th Cong. 1st Sess. 22 (1928), quoted in Helvering v. Griffiths,
318 U.S. 371, 397 n. 49 (1943). (Emphasis added.)
M Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 397 n. 49 (1943). (Emphasis added.)
124 Tbid.
125 Wenchel, op. cit. supra note 85, at 115. 126 1bid.
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closed intention of Congress, however imperfectly expressed in the literal
terms of the Act.n2
Thus far we have considered regulations under an ambiguous statute.
Suppose the superseded regulation is inconsistent with the literal terms of
that statute. In such case, it has been said, the ability of an administrator
to prescribe a retroactive rule "is measured by the ability of Congress
itself to make the retroactive command."'28 But, had Congress itself
enacted a successor statute which would alter pre-existing rights, a retro-
spective effect would be rejected unless required by the "unequivocal and
inflexible import of the terms, and the manifest intention of the legisla-
ture."'2 9 In more recent terms, "[rietroactivity, even where permissible,
is not favored except upon the clearest mandate."'3 0 The mere grant of
power to make regulations need not be read to authorize retroactive
regulations when an amendatory act by Congress itself would be jealously
read for the "clearest mandate" of retroactivity.'3'
But how, it may be asked, can estoppel be founded upon a regulation
that is void and of no effect because inconsistent with the "plain" terms of
the statute?13 2 This doctrine of absolute retroactive invalidity has been
"eroded" in an analogous case with the aid of a "realistic approach."' 3 In
Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank,'34 where a decree was
127 "But the fair interpretation of a statute is often 'the art of proliferating a purpose,'...
revealed more by the demonstrable forces that produced it than by its precisephrasing."
Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951). If,
said Mr. Justice Holmes on circuit, a legislature "has intimated its will, however indirectly,
that will should be recognized and obeyed. The major premise of the conclusion expressed in
a statute ... may not be set out in terms, but it is not an adequate discharge of duty for
courts to say: We see what you are driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore we shall
go on as before." Johnson v. United States, 163 Fed. 30, 32 (C.A. 1st, 1908), quoted with ap-
proval in Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 391 (1939).
128 Surrey, op. cit. supra note 121, at 569. See also Manhattan General Equipment Co. v.
Commissioner, 76 F. 2d 892, 896 (C.A. 2d, 1935).
29 United States v. Heth, 3 Cranch (U.S.) 399,413 (1806).
130 Claridge Apartments Co. v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 141, 164 (1944).
131 Compare note 101 supra. It is argued that if the old regulation is invalid, "the new
regulation should be given full retroictive effect, as otherwise the statute would be incomplete
and unworkable." Surrey, op. cit. supra note 121, at 569. The statute can become complete
and workable from the time the new regulation takes effect. An amendatory statute which was
not retroactive in express terms could accomplish no more.
132 Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936); Miller
v. United States, 294 U.S. 435, 439 (1935).
22 Warring v. Colpoys, 122 F. 2d 642, 646 (App. D.C., 1941) (per Vinson, J.).
24 308 U.S. 371 (1940). The reluctance with which courts overrule a prior decision on a
constitutional question suggests that the overruled decision no less departs from the "plain"
meaning of the Constitution than does a rejected regulation from the "plain" meaning of the
statute. "Absolute invalidity" is no more required in the one case than the other.
19541
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
attacked as lacking basis because the underlying statute was subsequently
declared unconstitutional, Chief Justice Hughes declared:
The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration... it is manifest from numerous decisions that
an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
justified' 5
'In the mentioned "decisions," the great majority of the state courts have
refused to give retroactive effect to an overruling decision which con-
strued a statute or constitution, when intermediate rights would be preju-
diced thereby.l 6 Such cases often cite Gelpcke v. Dubuqusel37 and related
federal cases. Because the reasoning of that decision is now suspect and be-
cause the anti-retrospective doctrine is frequently phrased in restrictive
terms, it is essential to examine whether these cases furnish a safe analogy
for refusal to give retroactive effect to a declaration that a regulation or
authoritative administrative interpretation is invalid.
Gelpcke v. Dubuque was a suit in a federal court upon municipal bonds
issued under state court decisions sustaining the power of issuance, which
decisions were later overruled by the state court. The Supreme Court's
intimation,' later made explicit, 3 9 that such a change of decision was
an unconstitutional impairment of contract met with vigorous dissent
from Mr. Justice Miller and has since been repudiated. 40 For purposes
135 Ibid., at 374.
130 The cases are collected in Snyder, Retrospective Operation of Overruling Decisions,
35 Ill. L. Rev. 121, 130 n. 101 (1940). For recent cases, see Florida Forest and Park Service
v. Strickland, 154 Fla. 472, 18 S. 2d 251 (1944); Swank v. Tyndall, 226 Ind. 204, 78 N.E. 2d
535 (1948); German Gymnastic Association v. City of Louisville, 306 Ky. 810,209 S.W. 2d 75
(1948); Gentzler v. Constantine Village Clerk, 320 Mich. 394, 398, 31 N.W. 2d 668, 669
(1948); Mississippi State Tax Comm. v. Brown, 188 Miss. 483, 509, 195 So. 465, 470 (1940);
Oklahoma County v. Queen City Lodge, 195 Okla. 131, 156 P. 2d 340 (1945).
237 1 Wall. (U.S.) 175 (1864). Consult Freeman, The Protection Afforded Against the
Retroactive Operation of an Overruling Decision, 18 Col. L. Rev. 230, 243 (1918).
13 1 Wall. (U.S.) 175, 206 (1864): "[if the contract, when made, was valid ... its validity
and obligation cannot be impaired by any subsequent action of legislation, or decision of its
courts altering the construction of the law." [Quoting Chief Justice Taney in Ohio Life & Trust
Co. v. Debolt, 16 How. (U.S.) 416,432 (1853).]
' Douglass v. County of Pike, 101 U.S. 677, 687 (1880), per. Waite, C. J.: "[W]e cannot
give them [new decisions] a retroactive effect without impairing the obligation of contracts
long before entered into. This we feel ourselves prohibited by the Constitution... from
doing."
14o The impairment clause "is directed only against impairment by legislation, and not by
judgments of courts.Y' Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444, 451 (1923). Chief Justice
Taft's rationalization of the Gelpcke case-that the federal courts under diversity jurisdiction
"held themselves free to decide what the state law was" and to choose the earlier rather than
later decision (ibid., at 452)-is hopelessly irreconcilable, as Mr. Justice Miller saw from the
outset [1 Wall. (U.S.) 175, 213 (1864)], with the established rule that in construing state
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of determining whether federal courts may refuse to give retroactivity to
their own decisions, it is of no moment that their constitutional power to
compel state courts similarly to act is today doubtful.1 41 Still relevant, how-
ever, is Mr. Justice Miller's insistence that the Gelpcke decision scuttled
the theory that courts merely declare and do not make law when they
overrule a decision.'4
Despite the fact that this "declaratory" theory is manifestly a "childish
fiction,"'' 4 that, as Sir Frederick Pollock said in 1906, "no intelligent
lawyer would at this day pretend that the decisions of the Courts do not
add to and alter the law,"' 44 the "ancient dogma" that the law declared
by the courts "had a Platonic or ideal existence before the act of declara-
tion"1' continues to be reiterated with unquestioning judicial fidelity. 46
But, the "dogma" is riddled by exceptions which are actually irrecon-
statutes or constitutions state courts have the last word. Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black (U.S.)
599, 603 (1862); Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387,401 (1941); cf. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938).
141 In Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358,364 (1932),
Mr. Justice Cardozo said that a state "may say that decisions of its highest court, though
later overruled, are law nonetheless for intermediate transactions. Indeed there are cases
intimating, too broadly, that it must give them that effect.. .. "
14 1 Wall. (U.S.) 175, 211 (1864). His view was adopted by Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting
in Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 371 (1910), and by Gray, Nature and Sources of
the Law, 256-57 (2d ed., 1921).
143 2 Austin, Jurisprudence, 655 (4th ed., 1873); see also Kocourek and Koven, op. cit.
supra note 66, at 986.
144 Notes by Frederick Pollock to Maine, Ancient Law 48 (1930). Holmes "regarded those
who doubted that the judges made law.., as simply incompetent or else carried away by a
hobby." 1 Holmes-Laski Letters 183 (1953). Holmes' early remark that "what the courts
declare to have always been the law is in fact new," Holmes, The Common Law 35-36 (1881),
had been anticipated: Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries 190, 198 (Everett ed.,
1928); Austin op. cit. supra note 143, at 655; Maine, supra, 37-38. See also Jeremiah Smith,
Sequel to Workmen's CompensationAfts, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 344,366 (1914).
145 Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358,364 (1932).
119A number of examples must suffice: Sunray Oil Co. v. C.I.R., 147 F. 2d 962 (C.A. 10th,
1945); Ruppert v. Ruppert, 134 F. 2d 497 (App. D.C., 1943); Peterson v. John Hancock
Mutual Insurance Co., 116 F. 2d 148 (C.A. 8th, 1940); Chelsea v. R. T. Green Co., 318 Mass.
85, 60 N.E. 2d 351 (1945).
' A recent commentator, despairing "of succeeding where the mighty have failed, accepts
the [declaratory] theory," Snyder op. cit. supra note 136, at 122, and attempts by involved
reasoning to show that it squares with a denial of retrospective operation to overruling de-
cisions. Ibid., at 145-53. Anticipating criticism that his synthesis "is merely a subterfuge to
avoid admitting that the judges 'make' law," he defends it because "it enlists habitual modes
of thought." Ibid., at 152. But "the refusal to admit the reality of judicial legislation does not
improve the process." Frank, Law and the ModernMind 215 (1930). See also-Blackstone v.
Miller, 188 U.S. 189, 204 (1903); Hammond-Knowlton v. United States, 121 F. 2d 192, 199
(C.A. 2d, 1941).
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cilable with the "declaratory theory"'147 and represent a revolt from con-
ceptualism at the call of justice.14 8 ,
The mistaken notion that retroactivity of overruling decisions collides
with the constitutional restriction on laws impairing the obligation of con-
tracts14 frequently led the courts to phrase the "exception" in terms con-
fined to contracts.5 0 Nevertheless, the exception has lustily expanded be-
yond these narrow confines,'5' the reason being that it was from the begin-
ning rested "upon the plainest principles of justice.' 5 2 The "exceptions"
merely called on the courts themselves to observe the ban on retroactivity
which they had laid down for the legislatures.' 5' Men have a right, in-
147 Though "most of the courts express nominal allegiance" to the declaratory theory,
"the hardship and mischief in its strict application has led many courts... to depart widely
from it in so-called 'exceptions.'" Freeman, op. cit. supra note 137, at 233; Snyder, op. cit.
supra note 136, at 130-33.
14' "It is difficult to sustain the exception on principle.... It is plainly an exception made
by the courts, at the call of justice." Falconer v. Simmons, 51 W.Va. 172, 178, 41 S.E. 193,
196 (1902). See also Laabs v. Tax Comm., 218 Wis. 414,417, 261 N.W. 404, 405 (1935). Mr.
Justice Cardozo has referred to the "spirit of realism" with which the courts have dealt with
the problem, saying that the result "may be hard to square ... with abstract dogmas," but
that the line was drawn because "the injustice and oppression of a refusal to draw it would
be so great as to be intolerable." Cardozo, Selected Writings 170 (1947).
149 Freeman, op. cit. supra note 137, at 236; Snyder, op. cit. supra note 136, at 133-34;
see, e.g., Thomas v. State, 76 Ohio St. 341, 81 N.E. 437 (1907); Harmon v. Auditors of Public
Accounts, 123 Ill. 122, 135, 13 N.E. 161, 165 (1887).
1"0 See Lewis v. Symmes, 61 Ohio St. 471, 485, 56 N.E. 194, 196 (1900); Falconer v. Sim-
mons, 51 W.Va. 172, 178, 41 S.E. 193, 196 (1902); Haskett v. Maxey, 134 Ind. 182, 191, 33
N.E. 358, 360 (1892); Snyder, op. cit. supra note 136, at 131.
" Snyder, op. cit. supra note 136, at 130-33. For non-contract applications, see Copper v.
Hawkins, 234 Ala. 636, 176 So. 329 (1937) (de facto officer protected against salary suit);
German Gymnastic Association v. City of Louisville, 306 Ky. 810, 209 S.W. 2d 75 (1948)
(taxes); Montana Horse Products Co. v. Great Northern Railway Co., 91 Mont. 194, 211,
7P.2d919, 925 (1931) (remedy); Statev.Hald, 327Mo. 567,586, 38 S.W. 2d44, 53 (1931) (pro-
cedure); Oklahoma County v. Queen City Lodge, 195 Okla. 131, 156 P. 2d 340, 362 (1945);
Kelley v. Rhoads, 7 Wyo. 237,239,51 P. 593 (1898) (remedy). For broad phrasing of the excep-
tion to retroactivity, see Mississippi State Tax Comm. v. Brown, 188 Miss. 483, 509, 195 So.
465, 470 (1940); Florida Forest & Park Service v. Strickland, 154 Fla. 472, 477, 18 S. 2d 251,
253 (1944); Payne v. City of Covington, 276 Ky. 380, 392,123 S.W. 2d 1045, 1051 (1938). But
some courts continue to read the "exception" narrowly: Donohue v. Russell, 264 Mich. 217,
219, 249 N.W. 830, 831 (1933); Jackson v. Harris, 43 F. 2d 513, 516-17 (C.A. 10th, 1930);
Linn County v. Rozelle, 177 Ore. 245, 283, 162 P. 2d 150, 165 (1945).
152 Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. (U.S.) 175, 206 (1864). The cases are collected in Snyder,
op. cit. supra note 136, at 140-42. The "singularly feeble" reasoning of the Gelpcke decision,
Gray, op. cit. supra note 142, at 257, was but an obeisance to judicial conventions. The motiva-
tion nakedly appears in the statement that "[w]e shall never immolate truth, justice, and the
law, because a state tribunal has erected the altar and decreed the sacrifice." Gelpcke v. Du-
buque, supra, at 206. In the words of the then Supreme Court Reporter, Wallace, in his preface
to the volume reporting Gelpcke v. Dubuque, the case was one "[wlhere high moral duties
were enforced upon a whole community, seeking apparently to violate them...." I Wall.
(U.S.) xiv (1864).
113 Geddes v. Brown, 5 Phila. 180, 187 (1863).
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deed, they are under a duty, to respect the decision of a supreme court,'
and they ought not to suffer for it."'
Absolute retroactive invalidity was thus rejected to avoid "injustice
and oppression"1ls True, the rejection has thus far been applied only to
overruled decisions by courts of last resort, the reason assigned by Mr.
justice Cardozo being that men know they cannot safely assume that
lower courts have finally settled general propositions. 157 But an adminis-
trative regulation or an authoritative legal interpretation must be dis-
tinguished'58 if we are not to invite litigation as a preliminary to compli-
ance. Such an invitation could hamstring administration. To encourage
reliance on the highest administrative pronouncement is to advance good
government. "9 Unless a man's trust in his government is protected, an
early court wisely observed,
every man is bound to question every act of government that affects him, and to
resist whatever he does not approve--a doctrine that would make government im-
possible 60
In a word, retroactivity, whether of judicial decisions, of legislation, or of
administrative regulations or interpretations, has little to commend it.'8 '
The anti-retroactive "exception" fashioned by the courts with respect to
their own decisions at the call of justice furnishes a sound analogy for pro-
tecting citizens who relied on regulations or authoritative interpretations
I" Harris v. Jex, 55 N.Y. 421, 424 (1874); Menges v. Dentler, 33 Pa. 495, 500 (1859);
Warring v. Colpoys, 122 F. 2d 642, 645 (App. D.C., 1941) (per Vinson, J.).
156 Farrior v. New England Mortgage Security Co., 92 Ala. 176, 180, 9 So. 532, 533 (1891);
Kelley v. Rhoads, 7 Wyo. 237, 239 (1898); Menges v. Dentler, 33 Pa. 495, 500 (1859); Hollins-
head v. von Glahn, 4 Minn. *190, *191 (1860); Swank v. Tyndall, 226 Ind. 204,222, 78 N.E.
2d 535, 543 (1948).
166 Authorities cited note 148 supra.
57 Cardozo, Selected Writings 170 (1947).
158 judge Paine stated in Kneeland v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 454*, 694* (1862) that "there are
many cases which would almost sustain the proposition, that the practical construction of
mere administrative officers, which have been acquiesced in for a long time, without any ju-
dicial decision whatever, should in such cases be followed, though in conflict with the Consti-
tution." But these cases have not come across this writer's ken.
1s9 Maguire and Zimet, op. cit. supra note 36, at 1305.
160 Menges v. Dentler, 33 Pa. 495, 500 (1859).
"I "Retroactivity is not favored in law.... There are few occasions when retroactivity
does not work more unfairly than fairly. Congress, the state legislatures and the courts apply
the principle sparingly, even where they may." Addison v. Holly Hill Company, 322 U.S. 607,
641 (1944) (dissenting opinion of Rutledge, Black, and Murphy, JJ.).
See 1 Kent's Commentaries 455 (14th ed., 1896); and authorities cited notes 129 and 130
supra. 1 Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution, 324-51 (1953), persuasively shows that the
constitutional "ex post facto" clause was originally designed to prohibit retroactive civil
as well as criminal laws.
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from declarations of retroactive invalidity. The drawing of the line in this
field, as Mr. justice Cardozo pointed out, should
be governed, not by metaphysical conceptions of the nature of judge-made law, nor
by the fetich of some implacable tenet, such as that of the division of governmental
powers, 162 but by considerations of convenience, of utility, and of the deepest senti-
ments of justice.163
Whether application of these principles to the tax field is precluded by
Section 3791(b) 64 remains to be decided. 5 Reliance on the literal terms of
that section1  is, I believe, mistaken. Be the initial regulation "legislative"
1
62 A refusal to give retroactive effect to a judicial decision raises no separation of powers
problem. The separation of powers is to be viewed in terms of what judges were actually
doing at the adoption of the Constitution, not in terms of descriptive labels that might be
attached to their activity by doctrinaires. Then, as now, judges made new law when they
announced a rule. Hence the courts are in no wise prevented by the separation of powers from
limiting the effect of a decision to the future.
163Cardozo, Selected Writings 170 (147). In United States v. Alabama G. & S. R. Co.,
142 U.S. 615, 621 (1892), a contemporaneous construction, "though inconsistent with the
literalism of the act" was "considered as decisive in this suit" by the Supreme Court because
it "consort[ed] with the equities" and avoided retroactivity which was "especially objection-
able" because prejudicial to a citizen.
Dean Griswold, op. cit. supra note 111, at 411, states that "[a]s a matter of wise tax ad-
ministration, the Treasury should be held to have no power to amend a legislative regulation
retroactively," and that after "an interpretative regulation becomes seasoned it becomes
something upon which people justifiably rely; and then the principle of retroactivity should be
given controlling force." Ibid., at 413.
' "See page 699 supra.
"'In Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110 (1939), and Helvering v.
Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 (1943), the Supreme Court held that reenactment of a statute in the
face of an existing regulation deprives the Treasury of the right to give a superseding regula-
tion retroactive effect. But the Court's elaborate analysis of the legislative history in the
Griffiths case, ibid., at 397 n. 49, which is the most recent case examining "3791," and its
invocation of the "principle" that "a long period of accommodation to an older decision some-
times requires us to adhere to an unsatisfactory rule to avoid unfortunate practical results
from a change," ibid., at 403, suggests that the promulgation of retroactive regulations may
not be sustained. See 10A Mertens, op. cit. supri note 49, at 109..
1661n Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 76 F. 2d 892 (C.A. 2d, 1935),
a divided court rejected the contention that a retroactive "legislative" regulation was invalid
under Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 370 (1932), on the ground
that § 3791(b) reserved power to make retroactive regulations and disclosed that regulations
were provisional and therefore subject to modification under Great Northern Railway Co.
v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287'U.S. 358, 361-62 (1932). The Court of Appeals relied on
the literal terms of § 3791(b), and cited Titsworth v. Commissioner, 73 F. 2d 385 (C.A 3d,
1934). The reasoning of the latter is obscure, unsatisfactory and in part untenable in light of
Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110 (1939), holding that reenactment of a
statute deprives the Commissioner of power to supersede a regulation retroactively. In Man-
hattin General Electric Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129 (1936), the Supreme Court held
that the initial regulation was void because in conflict with the statute, that the superseding
regulation therefore became the "primary" rule and was no more retroactive than a judicial
decision applying the statute to a case in hand. For analysis of these considerations, see page
701 supra.
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or "interpretive" in character, be the underlying statute ambiguous or
clearly in conflict with the terms of the regulation, I believe that it should
be conclusive with respect to those who relied upon it to their detriment.
CONCLUSION
Repudiation of representations is dirty business, no less at the hands of
-the government than of its citizens. Hence the claim of immunity for
governmental repudiation is tolerable only to the extent that it rests on
inescapable compulsions arising out of the needs of government. The sole
arguable compulsion resides in the separation of powers, which is said to
deny efficacy to administrative acts that are prohibited or beyond the
authority conferred. Whether this compulsion is inescapable may be
doubted in view of the judicial trend toward realism in applying the
separation of powers.
Certainly the absence of authority marks the furthest boundary of the
immunity from estoppel. Since government itself would bog down if
statutory "authority" had to be spelled out for each of myriad adminis-
strative acts, judicial inquiry into the existence of "authority" must not be
captious.
Nor is governmental irresponsibility for legal interpretations to be con-
doned by resort to the mistake of law doctrine. To demand that a taxpayer
should prophetically foresee that courts will declare the administrator
wrong is to forsake reality for Alice in Wonderland. Reliance by a tax-
payer on published regulations or rulings stands on even higher ground.
There is no clear-cut mandate to swallow retroactive repudiation in such
case. To the contrary, the express legislative intention to relieve from ret-
roactivity merely echoes the basic requirement of "fair-play" to which
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has himself adhered.
The claim of the government to an immunity from estoppel is in fact
a claim to exemption from the requirements of morals and justice. As
such, it needs to be jealously scrutinized at every step. Confidence in the
fairness of the government cements our social institutions. No pinch-
penny enrichment of the government can compensate for an impairment
of that confidence, for the affront to morals and justice involved is the
repudiation of a governmental representation.
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